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Abstract 
 
Previous generations of safety-related industrial control systems were ‘air gapped’.  In other words, process control 
components including Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and smart sensor/actuators were disconnected and 
isolated from local or wide area networks.   This provided a degree of protection; attackers needed physical access to 
compromise control systems components.  Over time this ‘air gap’ has gradually been eroded. Switches and 
gateways have subsequently interfaced industrial protocols, including Profibus and Modbus, so that data can be 
drawn from safety-related Operational Technology into enterprise information systems using TCP/IP.  Senior 
management uses these links to monitor production processes and inform strategic planning.  The Industrial Internet 
of Things represents another step in this evolution – enabling the coordination of physically distributed resources 
from a centralized location.  The growing range and sophistication of these interconnections create additional 
security concerns for the operation and management of safety-critical systems.   This paper uses lessons learned 
from recent attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructures to guide a forensic analysis of an IIoT switch.  The intention 
is to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities that would enable similar attacks to be replicated across Europe and North 
America.   
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the past, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) were isolated from conventional, digital networks. Specialist protocols, 
including Modbus and Profibus, were used to communicate between devices provided by many different suppliers. 
Over time this ‘air gap’ between industrial and conventional networks has gradually been eroded.    There has been 
an increasing convergence between ICS networks and Internet technologies. Protocols, such as Modbus TCP/IP, 
provide interfaces that enable users to interact with ICS applications using conventional computer networks.  The 
PROFINET industrial Ethernet protocol provides real time extensions to TCP/IP over Wireless Local Area 
Networks (LANs). These innovations not only increase the flexibility of ICS but also provide significant cost 
savings. They also enable monitoring and control applications to be run on mass-market equipment.  Industrial 
gateways/switches also help companies to monitor and control distributed resources without duplicating existing 
network infrastructures. Operators can carry network enabled, mobile control devices in a flexible manner, close to 
the point of need rather than being tied to a systems engineering desk. From a management perspective, enterprise 
planning and decision making tools can be informed by real-time process data delivered over their office newtorks 
to support collaborative situation awareness (Ref. 1).   
 
The development of industrial interfaces to conventional networks also creates potential vulnerabilities if attackers 
can exploit these mechanisms to gain access to safety-critical applications.   In other words, the convergence of 
industrial Operational Technology (OT) and conventional Information Technology (IT) has increased the potential 
attack surface.   These concerns have been exacerbated by the relative lack of progress in improving the cyber 
security of ICS applications.   Many industrial, serial protocols have well known vulnerabilities.  Messages are 
typically unencrypted and provide only weak means of authenticating their sender.   There are more robust variants; 
for instance Modbus Secure and EtherNET/IP Secure.  However, these are not yet widely used and can be difficult 
to integrate into legacy applications without incurring significant costs, especially in terms of the safety assessments 
that might be triggered by the introduction of these more secure protocols. 
 
There has only been limited adoption of the International Society of Automation (ISA) cyber-security 
recommendation (Ref. 2) or of evolving standards such as IEC 62443: Network and system security for industrial-
process measurement and control.  Such guidance encourages a lifecycle approach from development through to the 
operation and maintenance of secure ICS applications.   However, the lack of documented case studies and the 
perceived costs associated with their adoption dissuades many companies from benefitting from these techniques.  
In consequence, many ICS remain vulnerable, misconfigured, and available over TCP/IP. These vulnerabilities have 
numerous root causes, most of which do not stem from technical limitations. Network management is often out-
sourced to companies with limited experience in security- or safety-critical engineering.  
 
 
The Internet of Things 
 
There are strong parallels between the increasing connectivity of industrial control systems and the growth of what 
has become known as the Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT refers to physical objects – including domestic products 
such as fridges, televisions and microwaves but also buildings and vehicles that are embedded with sensor/actuators 
and with processing capability, which can be addressed through network interfaces.  A strong theme in the 
development of the IoT is the blending of the physical and the virtual.   Control actions on digital representations 
will have effects on their physical counterparts.  Things can be identified, interrogated and controlled across 
distributed computer networks creating interconnections across cyber-physical systems.  This has significant 
benefits in terms of the coordination and optimization of resources and of production processes.   It also offers 
remote monitoring capabilities and potential for novel forms of automation that can minimize the need for direct 
human intervention. 
 
Key application areas for the IoT include home automation where users can control heating, lighting, power systems 
from remote applications.   They can also program domestic appliances to react in particular ways when they sense 
changes in their environment.   For example, fridges may use Internet connections to schedule food deliveries when 
particular items have been exhausted.  On a wider scale, smart-city applications can sense congestion and respond 
by changing the timing of traffic control software.   They may also automatically schedule additional public 
transport services when video cameras detect large numbers of passengers waiting for a bus or light rail service.  
These applications rely on a high degree of interoperability.   Data can only be exchanged between sensors and their 
control applications if there are common protocols.   
 
Another requirement is that participants in the IoT must be able to handle significant amounts of senor data.  
Inferences about potential actions typically depend on identifying patterns across these senor values.   The ability to 
store and analyze heterogeneous data sources creates a range of privacy and security concerns.   There is an 
expectation that companies will take active measures to secure IoT devices and applications – this can include 
encryption by default and the anonymization of sensitive data.   It is also important that companies seek explicit 
consent from the data subjects if information is shared with other organizations.  Finally, companies should only 
collect the data that is needed for the intended use and hold it only as long as it is needed.   Concerns include the use 
of IoT data by criminals to time burglaries to coincide with periods when sensors show that a house is unoccupied.   
Other scenarios include disclosing health-related information through the data obtained from personal health 
monitoring systems.   
 
Many of these IoT security concerns also have implications for safety-related systems.  Novel sensing technologies 
are being used to automate and optimize traffic control, to inform and personalize health related decisions, to 
support ‘just in time’ distribution processes. These services rely on integrated, networked data sources that are 
increasingly providing the digital foundations for safety-related infrastructures. 
  
 
Progress in the Industrial Internet of Things 
 
As mentioned, the Internet of Things refers to physical objects that are embedded with sensor/actuators, which can 
be addressed through network interfaces. By extension the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) depends on the ability 
to access distributed ICS resources through conventional networks, typically over TCP/IP links.  This offers huge 
potential benefits – including the development of so-called ‘smart’ manufacturing and distribution systems; where 
processes can be automatically scheduled to respond to a customers needs or where distributed control systems can 
be used to optimize production systems around the globe through information integration.  Specific examples 
include ‘smart grid’ power systems where generation and distribution are precisely matched to consumer 
requirements; enabling the integration of novel and renewable sources. The ‘digital oilfield’ enables operators to 
control massively distributed resources from a single control room.   It also enables engineers to hand-over 
centralized control to another location in response to changing operational requirements; for instance, to increase 
resilience to infrastructure failures. 
 
The IIoT creates a number challenges.  In particular, it is hard to achieve the levels of interoperability that 
characterize the conventional IoT.  Traditional serial protocols were designed for ICS environments that only 
required limited connectivity (Ref. 3, 4).  It was never envisaged that safety-related processes might require 
thousands of programmable components.  In consequence, engineers have to resolve address limitations; Modbus by 
default only supports 254 devices on one data link. Such limitations have to be resolved before existing ICS 
protocols can support the level of connectivity envisaged in the IIoT (Ref. 5).   There are further concerns.  Modbus 
and the other serial protocols were also designed for relatively predictable interaction with industrial control 
systems.   They exploit traditional client/server architectures. The master must explicitly poll each of the networked 
devices. Components cannot raise asynchronous alerts in response to changing operating conditions. The simplicity 
of the master/slave architecture has significant advantages for the timing and reliability analyses that are required 
during safety assessments.  However, such models of interaction are less easy to integrate with more conventional 
TCP/IP networks that are intended to support asynchronous interaction. 
 
These ICS serial protocols were also originally developed to support communication between a relatively 
homogeneous array of devices, including Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and sensor/actuators.  In 
consequence, Modbus only supports data types that are recognized by PLCs.  It cannot support the arbitrary binary 
objects that are used within more conventional network architectures. Data objects are not supported by any meta-
data. The semantic information needed to understand and use an object has to be embedded within each client. If 
new forms of data are transmitted across a serial interface then every client may potentially have to be updated – 
raising significant cost pressures.  As we shall see, these device updates may also create possible attack vectors. 
 
A number of techniques have been developed to address these limitations of traditional ICS networks.   These 
include message queuing to support a publish/subscribe model.  Nodes register their interest in particular messages 
with a centralized broker.  These brokers will forward-on information of a particular type when polled by the device.   
The approach is effective because it filters unnecessary broadcast communication that might overwhelm the limited 
processing power of many ICS devices.  It provides limited asynchronous operation and a means of interfacing 
serial protocols with more conventional TCP/IP environments.  The storage of messages by the broker also helps 
provide a degree of resilience across networks with very different bandwidth and speed.  These message queuing 
gateways can also offer translation services to ensure the transmission of compatible data types into the OT 
networks. 
 
 
Security Concerns in the IIoT: Impact on Ukrainian Infrastructures 
 
Previous sections have argued that the Internet of Things raises a host of security and privacy concerns.   The ICS 
counterparts in the IIoT share many of these issues.  However, the potential consequences of attacks on safety-
critical infrastructures means that such concerns are increasingly placing limits on the development of innovative 
network enabled applications.  Regulators and investors are concerned about their risk exposure as complex, 
distributed systems are interfaced with public data networks.   These concerns are not simply theoretical.  The 
potential threats have been illustrated by recent attacks on a number of Ukrainian companies as part of the on-going 
conflict there.   One of these cyber-attacks was triggered on the 23rd December 2015 when a third party 
compromised regional electricity distribution systems (Ref. 6).  The attackers appear to have gained access more 
than six months prior this date.  They were able to cut the power supply by undermining a range of ICS devices.  
The outages affected three different distribution companies affecting some 225,000 customers. 
 
The subsequent investigation revealed that the attackers had exploited spear phishing emails to compromise the 
Ukrainian accounts.   These were carefully targeted attacks that used social engineering to encourage the recipients 
of the emails to open a malicious attachment; in most cases a Word document with harmful macro extensions.  Once 
an account had been compromised, they used this access to gain further logon credentials from the business network 
and to conduct an extensive reconnaissance of the associated ICS systems.  They were able to target directory 
service infrastructure to directly manipulate and control the authentication and authorization system.  They were also 
able to exploit the connectivity provided by IIoT applications; using legitimate VPN access to bridge between the 
corporate IT and industrial OT/ICS environments.   The attack was assisted by external suppliers listing some of the 
equipment used in the Ukrainian infrastructures, such as Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) vendors and versions.  It was 
the IIoT serial to Ethernet gateways, described in previous sections, which enabled the direct reconnaissance to take 
place before the attack was launched. 
 
Once the attack was triggered; a number of different ICS components were affected.   Initially, the human machine 
interfaces were compromised.  This prevented operators from issuing commands to the underlying systems.   Their 
commands were further undermined by the attackers’ ability to upload malicious firmware for the serial to Ethernet 
gateways that are core components of IIoT applications.   This ensured that once the operator workstations were 
restored, remote commands could not be issued to bring the substations online.  At the same time, the attackers were 
able to generate thousands of telephone calls to prevent legitimate customers from contacting the companies’ call 
centers.   The attackers were also able to undermine Uninterruptible Power Supplies so that when their attack 
disrupted the distribution network; the company itself lacked sufficient power to maintain its own computational 
infrastructure.  This illustrates how attackers can use IIoT infrastructures to sustain long-term reconnaissance of ICS 
networks and then to execute highly synchronized, multi-stage, multi-site attacks on safety-related systems. 
 
 
Defending the IIoT 
 
A number of lessons have been learned for the cyber-security of safety-related IIoT applications in the aftermath of 
the attacks on the Ukraine.   There was no two-factor authentication to protect the VPNs that were used to bridge 
from the office environment into the ICS networks.  Two-factor authentication is a means of establishing a user’s 
credentials using two independent mechanisms.  A bank cash machine can be used to illustrate this approach.  The 
user presents a card (something they possess) and a Personal Identification Number (PIN) (something they know).   
Even if an attacker learns the PIN, this is useless without access to the card.   In VPNs it is possible to use a similar 
card and reader to generate a one-time session key that would be hard for a remote attacker to obtain.  Such 
techniques are not foolproof but they raise the barriers to any intrusion between the conventional and ICS networks. 
 
The Ukrainian firewalls enabled the attackers to use administrative privileges to perform remote configuration tasks 
on the serial to Ethernet gateways.   These vulnerabilities were exacerbated by a lack of monitoring on ICS 
networks.  This is surprisingly common – given the bandwidth limitations within many industrial systems and also 
the potential need to demonstrate that the monitoring itself does not undermine safety.  However, the lack of such 
intrusion detection facilities helps to explain why the attackers remained undiscovered for up to six months. 
 
First Check Known Vulnerabilities.   We must learn from such incidents if we are to defend the growing array of 
applications across the Industrial Internet of Things.  This relies on a clear understanding of existing vulnerabilities.  
We, therefore, established an ICS forensic lab described at last year’s conference (Ref. 4).  Initially, our work 
focused on a forensic analysis of ‘air gapped’ systems including PLCs and sensor/actuators that were entirely 
isolated.  We then began to consider industrial protocols separated from more conventional networks by a physical 
‘gap’; i.e., there was no direct connection.   Over the last eighteen months, we have extended our test environments 
to support almost a dozen different protocols, which are interfaced with TCP/IP networks.   For security reasons, we 
do not make these networks more widely visible over the public Internet; we do not want others to access our 
devices nor do we want some of the techniques we have developed to affect other legitimate applications.   Some of 
the software we test has the potential to affect safety-related systems connected to these wider networks; equally we 
need to protect some of the devices that we examine from external discovery. 
 
Within one line of analysis, we are working to discover the strengths and vulnerabilities of the industrial switches 
and gateways that provide access between the more specialist ICS protocols and conventional TCP/IP networks. 
Further details about particular devices can be provided by contacting the authors at the address given in the 
biographies at the end of this paper.  We work with a range of industrial sponsors who identify the classes of devices 
that we investigate.  The aim is both to assess and then address the vulnerabilities of existing devices but also to help 
inform subsequent procurement decisions. 
 
Table 1 illustrates the starting point.   For most ICS components, there are publically available lists of known 
vulnerabilities.  The table summarizes the concern and provides a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 
assessment.  CVSS is a standard mechanism for assessing the severity of security vulnerabilities in a range from 0 to 
10, where 10 is the most severe.   In Table 3, the impact of an attack using these means on this particular IIoT switch 
should be apparent from the scoring. 
 
When our sponsors provide a new device to assess, we use the published vulnerabilities to guide an initial security 
assessment.  Most, but not all of these concerns, are addressed in subsequent software/firmware updates distributed 
by the vendors. However, these patches are seldom applied in critical applications because of the additional 
verification and validation costs that are required to demonstrate any modification does not compromise safety 
requirements. ‘If it ain’t broke, don't fix it’.  While this may be appropriate in terms of a safety assessment, it is no 
longer sustainable from a security perspective.   It is dangerous practice in a world where state-sponsored attackers 
have focused on vulnerabilities in firmware, distributed over compromised network connections.  
 
ICS Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) 
Number 
Description Vulnerability CVSS Score 
CVE-XXXX-XXXX Error log message which is 
displayed when a remote 
connection to the device 
fails, can identify an 
authentication pathway  
DoS Authenticate 8.6 
CVE-XXXX-XXXX Maliciously crafted 
packets could cause a 
restart 
DoS Restart 8.6 
CVE-XXXX-XXXX Corrupt the information in 
the local DNS cache using 
a malicious response 
message 
DoS Restart 9.9 
CVE-XXXX-XXXX Specially crafted packets 
sent on port 4786/TCP 
could cause a memory leak 
DoS Memory Leak 8.6 
 
Table 1 – Known Vulnerabilities in an IIoT Switch (Ack: ICS-CERT, Computer Emergency Response Team) 
 
Looking for Configuration and Access Control Vulnerabilities.   The high-level architecture of an IIoT switch was 
introduced in previous paragraphs.  These devices can store messages sent using Profibus or Modbus.  They can also 
inject messages from external TCP/IP networks.   They may filter some of this traffic – for instance to exclude 
erroneous types of data that would not be expected within an ICS environment. For example, email traffic should 
not be routed into the industrial domain.  The detailed operation, including the filtering mechanisms, of an IIoT 
switch can be controlled through configuration parameters. These may only be read or written if a user can provide 
appropriate access credentials.  Similar forms of authentication restrict administrative access, which has the 
additional ability to create or delete configuration accounts. The device considered in this paper is widely used and 
was provided by industrial co-sponsors of this work.  It is accessed through a device manager interface, broadly 
similar to those available for domestic routers.   Read-only access can be used to query the state of the switch 
including how many packets have passed through a port, its temperature etc.   In addition, administration accounts 
can make changes to the configuration of the switch.   On the device we received, the default password was still 
enabled as ‘Admin’. With this particular switch, the initial configuration required the user to reset the default 
password.  Hence it must be inferred that the initial recipient of the device chose to deliberately re-use the default 
Admin password.   This seems to be standard practice amongst many engineering teams even in safety-related 
systems where multiple people require access to critical devices.  Following the Stuxnet/Olympic Games and 
Ukraine attacks it is extremely important that such practices are identified and stopped immediately. 
 
Further analysis showed that the plaintext user names were stored together with an MD5 hash of the passwords and 
the associated access permissions in a configuration file.  Hashing is not a form of encryption – it cannot be used to 
recover the plain text but provides a characteristic value that can be used to check if any given text is similar to the 
stored hash value.   For example, an overly simplistic hash function might be the number of characters in a file.  If a 
character was added then the hash value would increase by one and a recipient of the file could detect the change.   
 
Any alteration that added one character and deleted another could not be detected; this problem is known as hash 
collision.  The MD5 algorithm suffers from a large class of known vulnerabilities and CMU’s Software Engineering 
Institute describes it as “unsuitable for further use” (Ref. 7).  Further concerns stem from the use of a weak, 
proprietary encryption algorithm to protect the switch’s administration account.   This is retained in addition to MD5 
so that the switch can exchange plaintext credentials over legacy protocols including Telnet, which in most cases 
should have been explicitly disabled for IIoT applications.   Telnet does not encrypt traffic, including passwords; 
hence anyone with a packet analyzer and access to the network can potentially gain credentials for these gateways 
and switches.   If Telnet is being used elsewhere on the network then a compromised IIoT gateway can be used in a 
recursive manner to analyze the packets being sent to other networked devices.  This enables the attacker to pivot 
through the network incrementally gaining more and more access privileges.  By default, the IIoT switch used the 
hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) to communicate with its device manager application running on a workstation. 
The credentials were again passed in clear text. 
 
The device supports access control lists.  These can be used to specify which IP addresses can communicate through 
particular ports on the device.  This creates the potential for implementing thresholds that might be associated with 
particular ports – to limit an external source from overwhelming or flooding the switch and thereby interrupting 
valid communication through other ports.  However, such potential security techniques raise questions for system 
safety engineers to identify appropriate values.   If a valid application exceeded the threshold then it would be 
denied access to the switch.   If the thresholds are set too high then they provide only limited protection against an 
attack.   In safety-related applications these values should be supported by detailed arguments that demonstrate it is 
acceptably safe to cut off communication above the particular values that are used to configure the device.  In 
contrast, an attacker with admin rights could set the cut-off values to zero and deny access to safety-related devices.  
This provides a further example of the need for safety and cyber security to be closely integrated in the detailed 
engineering of IIoT infrastructures. 
 
More Aggressive Forensic Attacks.  In previous papers, we have coined the term ‘forensic attack analysis’ – this 
goes beyond penetration testing and is intended to identify defenses as well as forensic techniques that can be used 
in the aftermath of a potential attack (Ref. 4).   In the case of the IIoT switch, we began to conduct a form of remote 
packet capture to learn as much about the network and the device as possible.  This stage of our analysis confirmed 
our concern about the vulnerability of the legacy protocols that were enabled on the switch.  One particularly useful 
source was packets sent using the proprietary protocol developed by the device manufacturer; our analysis tools 
were configured to filter these from the rest of the traffic so we could focus on this data.  They were weakly 
encrypted and it was straightforward to extract the IP number as well as the user credentials for the device. We were 
also able to monitor responses from the device to the configuration application, sent using HTTP GET – including a 
GIF with the temperature, which is updated every 60 seconds as well as the SHTM for the web page, JavaScript and 
CSS code. 
 
Once an adversary has the credentials for an authorized account and the device details, including the firmware 
version from the proprietary device protocol, they can begin to develop an attack vector.  The manufacturer’s 
website provides a host of additional information about the architecture of the switch. Second-hand devices are 
easily obtained from Internet marketplace sites; enabling adversaries to refine their techniques.  From then on, an 
attacker can replicate the events that played out across the Ukrainian energy infrastructures. 
 
For each of the vulnerabilities described above there are numerous defenses.  For instance, audits help to ensure that 
patches are applied.  This requires technical support and organizational commitment.  It also requires 
communication and coordination between the teams that are responsible for safety and for cyber security.   Safety 
engineers must understand the consequences of failing to apply a security patch.  Security managers must 
understand that there can be significant costs to ensure that a patch does not compromise safety.   
 
 
Conclusions and Further Work 
 
The ‘air gap’ that isolated previous generations of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) has been eroded. Gateways and 
switches now provide a bridge between specialist protocols, including Modbus and Profibus, and more conventional 
TCP/IP networks.   This creates external communications links with safety related process components including a 
vast array of PLCs, sensors and actuators. Senior management use these links to monitor production processes and 
inform strategic planning by connections between operational process technology and enterprise information 
systems.  On a larger scale, this has led to the development of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT).   IIoT 
applications offer huge benefits where global industries can coordinate distributed just-in-time production from a 
small number of centralized control rooms. Smart grid infrastructures provide one example.  Others include ‘digital 
oilfields’ and a host of urban applications that synchronize public services to meet user needs that are identified 
through remote monitoring technology. 
 
This paper focuses on the interactions between the safety and the cyber security of IIoT applications; illustrated by 
recent attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructures. We summarized the techniques that were used to undermine a 
portion of their energy distribution systems.  These included a prolonged period of surveillance after an initial 
penetration using spear phishing emails that encouraged individuals to open compromised attachments.  Once inside 
the enterprise information systems, the attackers gained valid VPN credentials to bridge into the ICS environment.  
When the attack was launched they disabled the industrial Human Machine Interfaces.  After the defenders restored 
these devices, they found that their TCP/IP switches had been compromised because the attackers had used the 
compromised network connections to install invalid firmware updates.  Techniques that can be used to defend 
against this form of attack are addressed in a companion paper for this conference1. These exploits were exacerbated 
by a simultaneous attack on VOIP communications systems. 
 
Later sections of this paper used the insights from the attacks on the Ukraine to focus our defensive analysis of an 
IIoT switch; used to interface between TCP/IP and serial protocols, including Modbus or Profibus.   Safety-related 
industrial sponsors provided the device.  The analysis began by demonstrating that some already publicized 
vulnerabilities continued to affect our version of the device even after patches had been applied.  In other cases, the 
operators of safety-related infrastructures have deliberately chosen not to patch their devices because of the 
additional verification and validation costs, even though this leaves them vulnerable.   
 
We exposed security concerns around access control, authentication and configuration of the IIoT switch.  With 
recent products, it is possible to disable many of the legacy features and to address these concerns over 
authentication – however; our cooperation with infrastructure providers has shown that this has not been done in 
many existing systems.  Finally we have used a number of hacking tools and network analysis techniques to build 
plausible attack vectors from the vulnerabilities identified in previous stages of our analysis.   
 
There are many directions for further work.   When devices are procured, in national critical infrastructures, teams 
need to be competent in what we term ‘forensic attack analysis’.  In other words, they need to know where to find 
potential vulnerabilities in configuration – especially in the use of hashing and legacy communication protocols.  
Increasingly in the IIoT we see devices that can be secured but only if the companies who supply them know what 
they are doing.  In Glasgow, we have developed a set of procurement criteria that can be used to guide this process.  
They extend existing reliability, dependability criteria to include cyber-security requirements.   We are using these 
within the context of UK critical infrastructures to provide informed guidance to our sponsors.  However, this 
information remains commercially sensitive and carries strong implications for national security hence it is unlikely 
to appear in the public domain. 
 
The closing aim of this paper has been to encourage safety engineers to undertake at least an initial course in cyber 
security. 
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